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With the passage of welfare reform in 1996, the Food Stamp Pro-
gram became the sole program in the safety net that resembles an en-
titlement. Subject to basic income and asset tests, individuals are eli-
gible to receive food stamps throughout their lifetimes, irrespective of 
family structure (as in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), dis-
ability status (as in Supplemental Security Income), and employment 
status (except for able-bodied adults with no dependents). Total expen-
ditures on the program, including administrative costs, exceeded $32 
billion in fi scal year 2006, making it comparable in size to the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and Supplemental Security Income programs. Still, 
nonparticipation among eligibles is rampant, and rates of participation, 
unadjusted for other factors, decline with age. Indeed, Cunnyngham 
(2003) reports that in 2001 the participation rate among elderly persons 
eligible for food stamps was 28 percent, versus an average participation 
rate of about 62 percent for the full population. This lower participation 
rate holds despite the fact that the elderly do not have to meet the gross 
income test and they have higher asset limits than the nonelderly. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the determinants of par-
ticipation in the Food Stamp Program, focusing on a variety of factors 
such as the business cycle and welfare reform (Wallace and Blank 1999; 
Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003), recertifi cation length (Kabbani 
and Wilde 2003), nutritive need for food stamps (Haider, Jacknowitz, 
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and Schoeni 2003), and rates of food insecurity (Gundersen and 
Oliveira 2001). However, none of the research to date has focused on 
participation across the life course or on the role of income volatility. 
Knowledge of how participation varies across the life course is impor-
tant to policymakers given the pending retirement of the fi rst years of 
the post–World War II baby boom generation. This demographic bulge 
may lead to higher rates of participation at older ages than in the past 
because this is the fi rst generation to grow up with the Food Stamp 
Program, which began in its modern form as part of the Great Society 
programs of the mid-1960s and became a national program in 1974. 
That is, historically participation has declined with age, but this could 
be a cohort phenomenon that may not carry forward in the future as 
younger generations have more exposure to the program and utilize 
it at higher rates. Many authors have documented a rise in earnings 
and income volatility over the past two decades (Blundell and Pistaferri 
2003; Gottschalk and Moffi tt 1994; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Haider 
2001). Identifying the role of income volatility both on average and 
across the life course of food stamp participation is important to pro-
gram design because participation is income-conditioned and strict re-
porting requirements apply to those participants who work and whose 
income varies. If potential recipients view the Food Stamp Program as 
an assistance program to be used in the face of negative income fl uctua-
tions but not when incomes are permanently low, changes in income 
volatility may be a factor. Because income volatility likely varies over 
the life cycle, we might expect the effect of volatility on the decision to 
use food stamps to vary across the age gradient.
In this chapter we narrow the gap in the literature by estimating 
the effects of age, birth cohort, and income volatility on Food Stamp 
Program participation. We use data from the 1980 to 2003 waves of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), along with standard mea-
sures of income volatility from Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994) and a 
correlated random effects estimator for the linear probability model 
(Hausman and Taylor 1981). The correlated random effects estimator 
is advantageous in this context because it permits identifi cation of both 
time-varying and time-invariant regressors, the latter of which include 
birth cohort and some of our measures of income volatility. For the 
sake of robustness we also estimate a correlated random effects estima-
tor without birth cohorts and a standard fi xed-effects linear probability 
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model, which still permits identifi cation of both the age gradient and the 
effect of volatility along the gradient. 
We fi nd that participation in food stamps is U-shaped across the 
life course, contrary to the conventional wisdom of simple summary 
statistics, which show participation declining monotonically across the 
age gradient. Consistent with the idea of greater familiarity with the 
Food Stamp Program encouraging participation, we fi nd that younger 
birth cohorts have higher rates of food stamp participation than earlier 
birth cohorts. We also fi nd that, in general, food stamp participation is 
higher across the age gradient among those with higher levels of in-
come volatility. 
PATTERNS OF FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION AND 
INCOME VOLATILITY OVER THE LIFE COURSE
We begin our analysis with a description of our data and then pres-
ent basic patterns of food stamp participation and income volatility over 
the life course. 
Data
The data we use come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) for interview years 1980–2003 (calendar years 1979–2002). The 
survey has followed a core set of households since 1968, plus it has fol-
lowed newly formed households as members of the original core have 
split off into new families. We begin in 1979 because this is when the 
Food Stamp Program ended the so-called purchase requirement, where 
recipients needed to pay for a set amount of discounted food stamps 
and the price was directly related to a household’s income. The PSID is 
advantageous because it contains detailed information on income and 
household composition, which permits us to construct long time series 
of income for various age groups and family structures.
The sample we use is an unbalanced panel treating missing obser-
vations as random events. By eliminating only a missing person-year 
of data, the time series for each household can be of different lengths 
within 1980–2003. To be included in the full sample, the household 
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head must 1) be in the sample at least three consecutive years, 2) not 
have year-to-year increases in real income1 exceeding 300 percent or 
declines exceeding 75 percent, and 3) have annual family income of 
more than $1,000 in infl ation-adjusted terms. We defi ne date-of-birth 
cohorts in 10-year intervals in the PSID in order to maintain adequate 
within-cohort sample sizes. There are 72,311 person-years in the full 
sample. This sample is useful to gauge population-level statistics of 
food stamp participation and income volatility. 
One disadvantage to the full sample is that many of the persons 
in this sample are unlikely ever to be eligible for food stamps. As a 
consequence, our estimates of the effects of income volatility and birth 
cohort on food stamp participation could be understated and less in-
formative for policy. For example, if income volatility is very high but 
income levels are always above the food stamp eligibility cutoff, the 
volatility will not infl uence the participation decision. In response, we 
create a series of samples that contain households more likely to enter 
the Food Stamp Program. One is an income-eligible sample, where we 
only include households that in any given year have incomes below 130 
percent of the poverty line, which is the gross income cutoff for food 
stamps. (The criteria for food stamp eligibility are defi ned in the next 
section.) There are 11,535 persons in this sample. Another is an ever 
income-eligible sample, where we broaden the income-eligible sample 
to contain households whose annual incomes dipped below 130 per-
cent of the poverty line at least once during the sample period. There 
are 30,305 persons in this ever income-eligible sample. The income 
samples permit us to make statements on the effect of volatility on par-
ticipation conditional on income eligibility.  
Given our interest in the effect of income volatility, one may be 
concerned that choosing a sample based on income would impart an 
endogeneity bias into our estimated coeffi cients. This endogeneity bias 
could arise because eligibility for food stamps is income-conditioned 
and thus we are selecting a sample based on a variable that is correlated 
with the dependent variable. As an alternative we select a subsample 
of family heads with less than a high school diploma (a low education 
sample). The advantage of using education is that it is exogenous to 
the food stamp eligibility formula but at the same time is a common 
proxy in economics for permanent income; that is, this sample is likely 
to select individuals with low permanent incomes and thus a high ex 
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ante probability of food stamp participation relative to family heads 
with higher levels of formal schooling (Bhattarai, Duffy, and Raymond 
2005; Gundersen and Oliveira 2001). There are 17,560 person-years in 
this sample. 
One potential drawback to the PSID is the smaller number of el-
derly persons in comparison to other surveys. In particular, it is smaller 
than the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Despite this smaller sample size, 
the PSID is the only data set with suffi cient number of years to 1) ad-
equately measure income volatility and 2) incorporate the effects of 
birth cohorts over an extended time period.
Food Stamp Participation
The Food Stamp Program, with a few exceptions, is available to 
all persons who meet income and asset tests. To receive food stamps, 
households must meet three fi nancial criteria: 1) a gross income test, 2) a 
net income test, and 3) an asset test. A household’s gross income before 
taxes in the previous month cannot exceed 130 percent of the poverty 
line, and net monthly income cannot exceed the poverty line.2 Finally, 
income-eligible households with assets of less than $2,000 qualify for 
the program. The value of a vehicle above $4,650 is considered an as-
set unless it is used for work or for the transportation of disabled per-
sons. Households receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) and households where all members receive Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI) are categorically eligible for food stamps and do 
not have to meet these three tests. There are two distinctions for older 
persons. First, persons over the age of 60 do not have to meet the gross 
income test. (But they do have to meet the net income test.) Second, the 
asset limit for persons over the age of 60 is $3,000 rather than $2,000.
A large fraction of households eligible for food stamps do not par-
ticipate. In 2005, for example, offi cial estimates indicate that 35 percent 
of eligible households do not participate (Wolkwitz 2007). A common 
argument made for the existence of eligible nonparticipation is that 
there may be a stigma associated with receiving food stamps. Stigma 
encompasses a wide variety of sources, from a person’s own distaste for 
receiving food stamps, to the fear of disapproval from others when re-
deeming food stamps, to the possible negative reaction of caseworkers 
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(Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor 1999; Moffi tt 1983). Another reason of-
ten suggested is that transaction costs can diminish the attractiveness of 
participation.3 A household faces these costs on a repeated basis when it 
must recertify its eligibility. Additionally, weighed against these costs, 
the benefi t level may be too small to induce participation; food stamp 
benefi ts can be as low as $10 a month for a family. In light of the low 
participation rates of the elderly, these factors may be especially rel-
evant for them.
In our fi rst set of fi gures we display food stamp participation rates 
by year for fi ve separate age categories: 1) under 30, 2) between 31 and 
40, 3) between 41 and 50, 4) between 51 and 60, and 5) 61 and older. 
These age categories are defi ned for the head of household. Figure 7.1, 
Panel A, is for the full sample and Figure 7.1, Panel B, is for the low 
education sample. In each panel, the food stamp participation rate is cal-
culated as the number of food stamp participants divided by the number 
of households in the sample. The rates are not weighted and thus the 
levels are likely upper-bound estimates, given the oversampling of the 
poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) subsample of the 
PSID. For both samples the participation rate of households headed by 
someone under the age of 30 exceeds that of all the other age categories 
(except the last two years in the low education sample) and, in some 
years, the under-30 versus over-30 gap can be quite large. Given the 
larger number of small children among households headed by someone 
under the age of 30 and the positive relationship between the presence 
of children and food stamp participation (Bartfeld 2003; Bollinger and 
David 1997; Hagstrom 1996), this is not entirely unexpected. Part of this 
age gap also likely arises from categorical eligibility for food stamps 
among families receiving AFDC/TANF; the latter program tends to be 
dominated by young families. Panels A and B of Figure 7.2 show our 
two income-based samples—income-eligible and ever income-eligible. 
The results for the latter look similar to the results for the low education 
sample in Figure 7.1. For the income-eligible sample in Panel A there 
are two primary differences with the other fi gures. First, the higher par-
ticipation rates for households headed by someone under the age of 
30 do not always hold. Second, the participation rates for households 
headed by someone over the age of 60 are substantially lower than for 
other groups. 
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In addition, the trends in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 shed some light on the 
demographic composition of the caseload underlying the much-studied 
rise in Food Stamp Program participation in the early 1990s followed 
by the subsequent decline in the late 1990s (Ziliak, Gundersen, and 
Figlio 2003). The increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s appears 
to have been initially driven by a surge in participation among families 
whose head was under age 30, followed by an increase in participa-
tion for families headed by someone in the 31–40 age group. However, 
participation among families with heads in the under 30 group started 
to decline around 1993 even though the peak in aggregate participation 
was not reached until 1995. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that the contin-
ued upward push came from those families whose heads were between 
the ages of 31 and 50. Participation then fell for all groups through 
2001. 
In Figures 7.3 and 7.4 we consider the infl uence of birth cohort 
on food stamp participation for the same samples as above. We sepa-
rate the sample into six birth cohorts depending on whether the family 
head was born prior to 1919, between 1919 and 1928, between 1929 
and 1938, between 1939 and 1948, between 1949 and 1958, or after 
1958. In Panels A and B of Figure 7.3, when we do not condition on 
income, the lines reveal a cohort effect for those heads born after 1958. 
In Panel A, a head born in the most recent cohort is on average at least 
50 percent more likely to participate in food stamps than heads from 
earlier cohorts, and this cohort gap more than doubles when the most 
recent cohort is compared to the 1939-to-1948 cohort. Among the low 
education sample (Panel B) the cohort effect between those born after 
1958 and those born between 1949 and 1958 is narrower than in the full 
sample, but the differences are still rather stark. Once we condition on 
income, in Figures 7.4, Panels A and B, the higher food stamp participa-
tion rates among later cohorts no longer hold to the extent that they do 
in Figure 7.3. Instead, a pronouncedly lower participation rate holds for 
the earliest birth cohort (before 1918), especially in the income-eligible 
sample.  
The post-1995 decline in food stamp participation is generally most 
pronounced among the post-1958 cohort and the pre-1919 cohort. The 
former is likely due to the strong macroeconomy and welfare reform–
related reductions in AFDC/TANF participation (given the categorical 
eligibility of AFDC/TANF recipients for food stamps). However, the 
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decline among the pre-1919 cohort is quite surprising given that this de-
mographic group is likely retired and thus was largely immune from the 
labor market effects of the expanding macroeconomy as well as welfare 
reform–related changes in the Food Stamp Program. At the same time, 
the late 1990s was also a time of nearly unprecedented growth in asset 
values, and thus the liquid asset test of $3,000 may have been binding 
for an increasing proportion of older Americans. These fi gures reveal 
possibly important cohort effects affecting both the level and trend in 
Food Stamp Program participation. 
Income Volatility
We next examine basic trends in income volatility over the past 
two decades. For our analysis we adopt standard measures of income 
volatility as utilized in Dynarski and Gruber (1997), Gottschalk and 
Moffi tt (1994), and Gundersen and Ziliak (2003), among others, by de-
composing income into permanent and transitory components. Let yit 
be the natural log of income for person i, i = 1, . . . , N, in time period t, 
t = 1, . . . , T, so that
(7.1)         , 
where μi is the permanent component and εit is the transitory compo-
nent. The corresponding person-specifi c and time-invariant measure of 
transitory income volatility is given by 
(7.2)               ,
 
where       is the person-specifi c time mean and Ti refl ects
 
the fact that the panel is unbalanced so that individuals are present in 
the sample for different lengths of time. The measure of permanent 
volatility is given by
(7.3)        ,
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up08djivafch7.indd   182 10/8/2008   10:37:21 AM
The Age Gradient in Food Stamp Program Participation   183
the transitory income variances in Equation (7.2), and T is the average 
across the number of time periods Ti. The transitory variance in Equa-
tion (7.2) refl ects within-group time series variation in income, whereas 
the permanent variance in Equation (7.3) refl ects between-group varia-
tion. Following the methodology used in Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994), 
for each of our four samples we purge income of life-cycle age effects 
by replacing y in Equations (7.2) and (7.3) with the residuals from a 
regression of income on a quartic in age. Purging volatility of age ef-
fects also prevents the confounding of direct age effects on food stamp 
participation with the indirect effects of age through income volatility.4
We consider two variants of Equations (7.2) and (7.3), one based 
on all sample periods pooled together and one where we take higher-
frequency measures of instability from 1980–1984, 1985–1989, 1990–
1994, and 1995–2002. One way to view the low-frequency versus high-
frequency estimates of transitory variances in Equation (7.2) is that the 
low-frequency estimates (which could be based on upwards of 20 years 
of data) are akin to person-specifi c permanent variances and the high-
frequency estimates are more refl ective of traditional transitory vari-
ances. Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994) split their sample into nine-year 
intervals to portray changes in earnings instability between the 1970s 
and 1980s. Although we are less interested in exploring broad, decadal 
trends in income volatility in the detail of Gottschalk and Moffi tt, we 
do highlight some important trends and interactions of income volatility 
with food stamp participation.  
In Table 7.1 we depict transitory and permanent low-frequency in-
come volatility for each of our four samples. By columns, we consider 
these measures for all households within any given sample, followed 
by the same age breakdowns as in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The volatility 
measures broken down by age use the residuals from a pooled regres-
sion across all ages—i.e., the regression coeffi cients are not allowed to 
vary by age; thus, the estimates in Table 7.1 refl ect changes in sample 
composition and not changes in age-earnings profi les per se. There are 
a number of observations that should be noted about Table 7.1. First, 
permanent income volatility is substantially higher than transitory vola-
tility regardless of sample. Second, transitory income volatility among 
the income-eligible, ever income-eligible, and low education samples 
exceeds that for the full sample across the age spectrum (with one ex-
ception). This is to be expected, given the greater labor market churning 
–
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among poorly educated and low-income adults in the United States. 
Third, in general, income volatility is lowest for the over-61 group 
across all four samples.
Table 7.2 replicates the results in Table 7.1 for the high-frequency 
income volatility measures. A comparison of Tables 7.1 and 7.2 demon-
strates that the estimated high-frequency volatility across all age groups 
is substantially smaller than the level of volatility measured at low fre-
quency (again, with only one exception). This is consistent with our 
conjecture that estimates from Equation (7.2) based on all sample years 
are more akin to a person-specifi c permanent volatility measure. (Note 
that the levels of volatility, even at fi ve-year intervals, exceed those in 
Gottschalk and Moffi tt [1994]. This occurs because they use earnings as 
opposed to income and they restrict their sample to white male heads of 
household while we admit nonwhites and female-headed families.) We 
also note that for most age groups income volatility spikes in the mid-
1990s, though it did so a bit earlier among the currently income-eligible 
population, which may have helped spur the growth in caseloads in the 
early 1990s.
We conclude our descriptive section by examining a simple bivari-
ate relationship between income volatility and Food Stamp Program 
participation. Specifi cally, in Table 7.3 we split the sample by quartiles 
Table 7.1  Transitory and Permanent Low Frequency Income Volatility 
by Age Groups 
All Under 30 31–40 41–50 51–60 Over 61
Full sample
Transitory 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15
Permanent 0.60
Low education sample
Transitory 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.15
Permanent 0.51
Income-eligible sample
Transitory 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.44 0.41 0.13
Permanent 0.54
Ever income-eligible sample
Transitory 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.45 0.24
Permanent 0.62
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Table 7.2  Transitory and Permanent High-Frequency Income Volatility 
by Age Groups 
All Under 30 31–40 41–50 51–60 Over 61
Full sample
1985
Transitory 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Permanent 0.57
1990
Transitory 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06
Permanent 0.67
1995
Transitory 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10
Permanent 0.71
2000




Transitory 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08
Permanent 0.64
1990
Transitory 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07
Permanent 0.62
1995
Transitory 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.10
Permanent 0.59
2000




Transitory 0.12 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.04
Permanent 0.66
1990
Transitory 0.17 0.20 0.30 0.09 0.25 0.03
Permanent 1.00
1995
Transitory 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.09 0.11 0.12
Permanent 0.80
(continued)
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All Under 30 31–40 41–50 51–60 Over 61
Income-eligible sample
2000




Transitory 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.09
Permanent 0.65
1990
Transitory 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.42 0.12
Permanent 0.93
1995
Transitory 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.12 0.32 0.21
Permanent 0.92
2000
Transitory 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.09
Permanent 0.65      
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
Table 7.2  (continued)











Full sample 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.21
Low education sample 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.36
Income-eligible sample 0.27 0.43 0.58 0.58
Ever income-eligible sample 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.28
High-frequency income volatility
All income sample 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.18
Low education sample 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.32
Income-eligible sample 0.30 0.44 0.53 0.55
Ever income-eligible sample 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.28
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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of transitory income volatility (at high and low frequencies) and then 
for each quartile we depict the level of food stamp participation for each 
of our samples. The results indicate that food stamp participation is 
increasing in income volatility. The difference is especially clear when 
comparing the fourth and fi rst quartiles across each of the samples. This 
suggests that, in addition to age and cohort, income volatility may be an 
important determinant of food stamp use.
The Age Gradient in Food Stamp Program Participation
Estimation methods
The standard static model of welfare participation in economics is 
to postulate that participation occurs if and only if the net utility gain is 
positive—that is, if the utility of participating less the cost of participat-
ing and less the utility of not participating is positive. Defi ning
1( ; 1)it itV y FSP =
as the indirect utility obtained from income 1ity  while on food stamps
( 1itFSP = ), and 
0( ; 0)it itV y FSP =  
as the corresponding indirect utility when not participating in food 
stamps, then the individual participates if
1( ; 1)it itV y FSP =  – 
0( ; 0)it itV y FSP =  > 0. 
Note that for simplicity we assume the indirect utility function as de-
fi ned incorporates any direct utility costs of program participation such 
as the stigma and transaction costs described above. If direct prefer-
ences are additive over time, then under two-stage budgeting (whereby 
the individual equates the discounted marginal utility of wealth across 
periods and then maximizes current period preferences over consump-
tion, leisure, and welfare participation), the static model of welfare par-
ticipation is “life cycle–consistent” (Blundell and Macurdy 1999). This 
implies that all lifetime preference parameters are identifi ed except for 
the time discount rate and the intertemporal substitution elasticity. As 
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the latter parameters are typically not focal parameters of interest in 
welfare applications, the static model is fairly general. 
To estimate the roles of age and income volatility in the food stamp 
decision we adopt a reduced-form, index-function version of food stamp 
participation. Let
 
(7.4) FSPit = 1 if 
* 0it it i itFSP Z X u ; 
   
 FSPit = 0 otherwise ,
where *itFSP is the latent propensity to participate in food stamps, Zit is 
a (1 × L) vector of time-varying variables determining participation, Xi 
is a (1 × L) vector of time-invariant variables, and  and γ are vectors 
of unknown parameters to estimate, and uit is a compound-error term 
equal to uit = αi + ηit . The elements of Zit include the age gradient as 
represented by the same series of indicators as in Figures 7.1 and 7.2—
interactions between transitory income volatility and the age gradient, 
marital status, homeownership status, and family size. Elements of Xi 
include the race of the head, whether the head is a high school graduate, 
date-of-birth cohorts as defi ned in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, and transitory 
income volatility as defi ned in Equation (7.2). Permanent volatility will 
be absorbed in the constant term. When we use income volatility de-
fi ned over fi ve-year time horizons, this measure will be included in Zit . 
Because the model is in reduced form we assume that
 
 [ | , ] 0 ,is it iE Z X s t , 
which is the typical strict exogeneity assumption between covariates 
and the time-varying idiosyncratic error term. However, αi , which rep-
resents latent time-invariant preferences for Food Stamp Program par-
ticipation, is in general not uncorrelated with the regressors, i.e.,
 [ | , ] 0i it iE Z X . 
This correlated random effect can arise for a number of reasons, in-
cluding preferences for welfare participation that vary across education 
levels or birth cohorts.  
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Estimation of nonlinear discrete choice models in the presence of 
correlated unobserved heterogeneity is complicated because simple 
transformations such as fi rst differencing do not eliminate the time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, αi , the exception being the con-
ditional logit estimator of Chamberlain (1980). Most estimators such 
as the panel probit estimator require a large number of time periods 
for consistent estimation of both  and αi. A transparent alternative is 
a panel version of the linear probability model. A concern with this 
estimator is that predictions may lie outside the unit interval. However, 
this concern is not germane to this chapter insofar as the focus is on the 
effects of age and income volatility on food stamp participation and not 
on the predicted probability of participation per se.
Admitting unrestricted correlation between unobserved heterogene-
ity and the covariates would lead one to apply OLS to the transformed 
model 
(7.5) it it itFSP Z ,
where
 it it iFSP FSP FSP  ,        it it iZ Z Z  ,        it it i





i it i it
t ti i




    
 
Estimation of Equation (7.5) yields the so-called within or fi xed-effects 
estimator. Although providing consistent estimates of , the cost of this 
approach is that it is no longer possible to identify the coeffi cients on 
the time-invariant variables Xi. This implies that it is still possible to 
identify the interaction between time-invariant low-frequency income 
volatility and the age gradient, but not the level effects of low-frequen-
cy volatility, education, or cohort on food stamp participation. (Level 
effects of high-frequency volatility from the fi ve-year estimates are 
identifi ed given suffi cient time series variation.) 
ˆ        ˆ
it
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To identify the effect of time-invariant factors, we use the correlated 
random effects estimator of Hausman and Taylor (1981). The idea here 
is to exploit the fact that some of the regressors are correlated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity and some are not.5 Any time-varying vari-
ables that are uncorrelated with the latent heterogeneity αi can be used 
as instrumental variables for time-invariant variables that are correlat-
ed. Provided that the number of uncorrelated time-varying variables is 
at least as large as the number of correlated time-invariant variables, the 
coeffi cients on the latter are identifi ed. 
More specifi cally, let
 
1 2[ , ]it it itZ Z Z=  ,
where 1itZ  is a (1 × K1) vector of time-varying variables uncorrelated 
with
 1, [ | ] 0i i itE Z , 
and 2itZ  is a (1 × K2) vector of time-varying variables correlated with 
 
2, [ | ] 0i i itE Z . 
Likewise, let 
 
1 2[ , ]i i iX X X=  
be the corresponding (1 × L1) and (1 × L2) vectors of time-invariant 
regressors, with 
 1[ | ] 0i iE X  and 
2[ | ] 0i iE X  . 
Ignoring for the moment the fact that our panel is unbalanced, we re-
write the estimating equation of interest in matrix form as
(7.6)  FSP Z X ,
where FSP is (NT × 1), Z is (NT × [K1 + K2]), and X is (NT × [L1 + L2]) . 
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Then let 
 2cov( ) ,       1 2a aQ P ,       
1/2
a aQ P  ,
 a NT aQ I P , 
1





where aQ  is the within (deviation from time mean) transformation, aP  
is the time-mean operator, NI  and NTI  are   (N × N) and (NT × NT) 
identity matrices, and Te  is a (T × 1) vector of ones. Letting D = [Z , X] 
be the matrix of regressors and [ , ] be the vector of parameters, 
then in order to make the error covariance matrix in Equation (7.6) ho-
moskedastic it is necessary to premultiply both sides of the equation by 
1/ 2Ω , as follows:
(7.7)  1/2 1/2 1/2 ( )FSP D  .
Hausman and Taylor (1981) then suggest the following instrumen-
tal variables estimator for Equation (7.7):
(7.8)  1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2ˆ [ ]w wD P D D P FSP ,
where 1( )wP W W W W
−′ ′=  is the projection matrix of instruments W. For 
instruments they suggest 
 1 2 1 1[ , , , ]a a a aW Q Z Q Z P X P Z= ; 
that is, the deviation from time means 1 2,a aQ Z Q Z  are instruments for Z1 
and Z2 , while the time mean of Z1, 1aP Z , serves as an instrumental vari-
able for the correlated time-invariant regressor X2. The time mean of X1 
is an instrument for itself. So long as the order condition 1 2K L>  is met 
then all model parameters are identifi ed. As our base case we categorize 
the regressors as follows: 
 1 2ˆ[ , * , ]
i
j j
it it it tZ Age Age year  , 
 2 [ , , ]it it it itZ married owner family=  ,
 1 2ˆ[ , ]
ii i
X race  , 
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and
 
2 [ , ]i i iX education cohort=  , 
where jitAge  represents the various indicators for the age gradient 
(j = ≤ 30, > 30 and ≤ 40 , > 40 and ≤ 50, >50 and ≤ 60, > 60). We assume 
that preferences for marriage, home ownership, family size, and educa-
tion are correlated with latent preferences to participate in food stamps, 
and that different birth cohorts through varied socialization mechanisms 
have different (and possibly correlated) preferences for food stamp use. 
We have no strong priors to assume that race is correlated with latent 
preferences to participate conditional on the other covariates and there-
fore assume it is uncorrelated. Likewise, we assume that income vola-
tility is uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity. Note that this does 
not imply that the level of income is uncorrelated with α1, but the vari-
ance is assumed to be uncorrelated. This is a standard assumption that is 
justifi ed provided that volatility is driven by demand-side market forces 
or other factors unrelated to time-invariant latent heterogeneity.
To make the estimator operational we fi rst need to replace Ө with a 
consistent estimate. It is recommended that initial consistent estimates 
be obtained by the within-fi xed-effects estimator (FE) and that the vari-
ance terms be constructed as











 it it iFSP FSP FSP= −  
and 
 it it iD D D= −%
were the deviations from time mean. Under the correlated random ef-
fects structure this estimator is asymptotically more effi cient than the 
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within estimator. However, in the event that the assumed lack of cor-
relation between 1itZ and α1 is violated, then the Hausman and Taylor es-
timator is inconsistent. For robustness, then, we compare our results to 
those estimated from the within estimator. We also compare our results 
with a Hausman and Taylor estimator, which does not include birth 
cohorts. It is well known that separate identifi cation of age, year, and 
cohort effects is complicated without strong functional form assump-
tions (Heckman and Robb 1985), though in our case the presence of an 
unbalanced panel aids in identifi cation because new cohorts enter the 
panel later in the sample period. That said, we are interested in under-
standing how sensitive the estimated age gradient is to the inclusion of 
cohort effects.
Results
Our results from the Hausman and Taylor estimator with endoge-
nous cohort effects are presented in Table 7.4 for our four samples. Here 
we look at the low-frequency measures of income volatility; below we 
consider the high-frequency measures. Recall that in the low-frequency 
model transitory volatility is time-invariant and thus is an element of 
1
iX , whereas in the high-frequency model transitory volatility varies 
over time for each individual and thus is an element of 1iZ . The respec-
tive transitory income volatility measures are de-meaned prior to inter-
acting with the age gradient, implying that the direct effect of volatility 
yields the mean effect and the interactions refl ect deviations from the 
mean. In both cases permanent volatility is absorbed into either the con-
stant term or year dummies and thus is not identifi ed. 
The results in Table 7.4 indicate that there is a U-shaped pattern 
to food stamp participation across the age gradient for the full, low 
education, and ever income-eligible samples. Across all three of the 
samples, the bottom of the U is for those between the ages of 41 and 
50. The peak for all three samples is for households headed by someone 
over the age of 60. These results suggest that, controlling for other fac-
tors, Food Stamp Program participation is not monotonically declining 
across the age gradient. The results for the income-eligible sample are 
not U-shaped, nor are they decreasing across the age gradient. Instead 
they are fl at across the age gradient.
The direct effect of transitory income volatility on food stamp par-
ticipation at the mean level of volatility depends on the sample. For the 
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Table 7.4  The Effect of Age and Income Volatility on Food Stamp Participation: Hausman-Taylor with Endogenous 








Age between 31 and 40 −0.02 −0.04 0.00 −0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 −0.02 −0.07 −0.01 −0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Age greater than 60 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Income volatility 0.23 0.07 −0.06 −0.02)
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.03 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.05 0.42 0.04 0.02 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility −0.21 0.14 0.07 0.03 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01)
Homeowner −0.03 −0.03 −0.06 −0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
up08djivafch7.indd   194
up08djivafch7.indd   194
10/8/2008   10:37:33 A
M
10/8/2008   10:37:33 A
M
   195
Married −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
High school graduate −0.08 −1.12 −0.02
(0.08) (0.13) (0.17)
White −0.14 −0.17 0.00 −0.18
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Family size 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Born between 1949 and 1958 −0.07 −0.14 0.03 −0.09
(0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Born between 1939 and 1948 −0.10 −0.16 −0.24 −0.07
(0.02) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
Born between 1929 and 1938 −0.07 −0.20 −0.59 −0.16
(0.07) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15)
Born between 1919 and 1928 −0.19 −0.29 −0.48 −0.11
(0.08) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17)
Born before 1918 −0.03 −0.13 −0.83 −0.16
(0.10) (0.13) (0.21) (0.19)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 
in the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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full sample, persons with high levels of volatility over long time hori-
zons—i.e., permanently high volatility—are more likely to participate 
in the Food Stamp Program. In the low education sample this effect is 
also positive but it is statistically insignifi cant. That food stamp use is 
higher among those with high volatility over low frequencies is in ac-
cord with Blundell and Pistaferri (2003), who fi nd that food stamps are 
very effective in smoothing consumption in the face of permanent in-
come shocks. In contrast, for the income-eligible and the ever income-
eligible samples the effect of income volatility is negative and signifi -
cant. Across the different samples, as the probability of being eligible 
for food stamps increases, there is a corresponding decline in the effect 
of income volatility. One possible explanation for these differences for 
the samples that may not always be eligible for food stamps (i.e., for 
all the samples except the income-eligible sample) is that higher vola-
tilities among those at greater risk of food stamp participation include 
spells above the food stamp eligibility cutoff, which highlights the pos-
sible endogeneity of this sample selection.
We now consider the effects of income volatility across different 
ages. To do so, we depict the total effect of age and interactions of age 
with income volatility (along with the respective 95 percent confi dence 
interval) for a representative individual at each age range, with income 
volatility one standard deviation below or one standard deviation above 
the mean level of volatility. Panels A–D of Figure 7.5 refer to the four 
samples at low-frequency volatility. For the full sample, the effect of 
income volatility is relatively constant across the age spectrum with the 
exception of those over age 61 with lower income volatility—they have 
higher probabilities of food stamp participation in comparison to those 
younger than 30. For the low education sample, lower income volatility 
is associated with lower probabilities of food stamp participation for 
those aged 31–50 in comparison to those younger than 30, and higher 
income volatility is associated with higher probabilities of food stamp 
participation for those aged 51–60. More consistent patterns emerge 
for the income-eligible samples: there, household heads aged 51 and 
older with higher income volatilities are more likely to participate in the 
Food Stamp Program. One caution in interpreting these results is that 
the distributions of both low- and high-frequency income volatility are 
skewed and widely dispersed so that one standard deviation above the 
mean is in the far right tail of the distribution.
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Figure 7.5  Effects of Low Frequency Income Volatility on Food Stamp Program Participation
1 std. dev. below mean, 95% confidence bounds
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Figure 7.5, Panels A and B, also provides insights into the role of 
income volatility at any given age. Comparisons of income volatilities 
one standard deviation above the mean and below the mean indicate 
that in general households with higher income volatility are more likely 
to receive food stamps.
While the effect of age on food stamp participation is U-shaped, 
the effect of birth cohort is generally declining with respect to earlier 
birth cohorts. In comparison to the base group (those born after 1959), 
for each of the samples every birth cohort either has statistically the 
same probability of food stamp participation or a lower probability. In 
terms of other variables in the regression model they generally align as 
expected; namely, food stamp participation is lower among those with a 
high school diploma or more, among white families, among homeown-
ers, among married couples, and among those with small families.  
We now turn to the results (Table 7.5) where we use a high-fre-
quency measure of income volatility. Like the results for the low-fre-
quency measures, the effect of age is still, except for the income-eli-
gible sample, U-shaped, but this is primarily due to dips in participation 
rates in the ages between 31 and 50 rather than increases in the post-50 
age group. The effect of high-frequency income volatility is statistically 
insignifi cant with the exception of the low education sample, where it 
is negative and signifi cant. As seen in the fl at lines in Figure 7.6, Panels 
A–D, the effect of income volatility at all age levels is insignifi cant. 
At any given age, the differences between higher and lower levels of 
income volatility are much more narrow than is the case with low-fre-
quency income volatilities. Earlier birth cohorts, as in Table 7.4, are in 
general as likely or less likely to receive food stamps in comparison to 
more recent birth cohorts, for all samples.
As mentioned previously, separate identifi cation of age, period, and 
cohort effects is generally achieved by imposing functional form re-
strictions on the respective parameters. One such restriction is to zero 
out the cohort effects and examine how the age coeffi cients change with 
the omission of controls for birth cohort. In Table 7.6 we present the 
results from the Hausman-Taylor estimator without cohort effects under 
low-frequency income volatility. One primary difference in the results 
in Table 7.4 is that, for the low education and income-eligible samples, 
across all age groups participation in food stamps is lower than for the 
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under 30 group. In other words the U-shaped pattern for the former 
sample and the fl at age profi le for the latter sample no longer hold.
An alternative restriction that can be imposed to eliminate birth co-
horts is to assume that all covariates are correlated with the unobserved 
propensity to participate in food stamps, though at the cost of no longer 
identifying other time-invariant variables such as our measure of low-
frequency income volatility. In Table 7.7 we impose this assumption for 
the low-frequency income volatility measures and present results from 
fi xed-effects linear probability models. Here, the results regarding the 
relationship between the age profi le and food stamp participation are 
more similar to those found in Table 7.4. 
In Tables 7.8 and 7.9 we repeat the exercises from Tables 7.6 and 
7.7, only now for the high-frequency income volatility measure. One 
key difference from the results for Table 7.5 is that income volatility 
has a positive and signifi cant effect on food stamp participation in the 
low education sample in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 while it has a negative and 
signifi cant effect in Table 7.5.
CONCLUSION
We used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics over the 
past two decades to estimate the effect of age, income volatility, and 
interactions of age and volatility on the probability of participating in 
the Food Stamp Program. We employed the correlated random effects 
estimator of Hausman and Taylor (1981), which permits identifi ca-
tion of parameters on both time-varying and time-invariant regressors. 
We found that participation in food stamps is U-shaped across the life 
course and that younger birth cohorts have higher rates of food stamp 
participation than earlier birth cohorts. We also fi nd that, in general, 
food stamp participation is higher across the age gradient among those 
with higher levels of income volatility. 
Our results have four main implications for policymakers and Food 
Stamp Program administrators. First, contrary to common expectations, 
we found that, after controlling for relevant factors, older persons actu-
ally have higher rates of participation than younger persons, especially 
in comparison to those between the ages of 31 and 50. While outreach 
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Table 7.5  The Effect of Age and Income Volatility on Food Stamp Participation:  Hausman-Taylor with 








Age between 31 and 40 −0.02 −0.05 0.00 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 −0.02 −0.08 −0.01 −0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Age greater than 60 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.02 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Income volatility −0.02 −0.18 −0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.09 0.32 −0.01 0.00 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.09 0.30 0.21 0.01 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.15 0.44 0.01 0.00 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility −0.01 0.16 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Homeowner −0.03 −0.03 −0.06 −0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
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Married −0.02 −0.03 0.00 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
High school graduate −0.48 −1.20 −0.11
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12)
White −0.06 −0.19 0.04 −0.17
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Family size 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Born between 1949 and 1958 −0.02 −0.04 0.17 −0.02
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
Born between 1939 and 1948 −0.09 −0.21 −0.29 −0.13
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05)
Born between 1929 and 1938 −0.14 −0.04 −0.50 0.04 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10)
Born between 1919 and 1928 −0.23 −0.36 −0.40 −0.34
(0.15) (0.13) (0.22) (0.12)
Born before 1918 −0.20 0.01 −0.80 0.03 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 
in the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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to the elderly may remain an important policy intervention for other 
reasons, our results demonstrate that concerns about low participation 
rates among the elderly may be overstated. Second, if any age group 
should be targeted for outreach, it is probably those between the ages 
of 31 and 50, perhaps by improving the application and recertifi cation 
procedures to better accommodate the working-age population. Third, 
our results show that later birth cohorts have higher rates of participa-
tion than earlier birth cohorts. As a consequence, in the absence of other 
factors, in the future there may be a permanent increase in the number 
of food stamp recipients. Fourth, our results show some evidence that 
lower income volatility is associated with lower probabilities of receiv-
ing food stamps. One possible reason for this result is that potential 
recipients with low but steady incomes may perceive food stamps as a 
program to be used only in response to negative income shocks. In re-
sponse, outreach to those known to have more constant income patterns 
may be worthwhile.
We conclude with a few suggestions for future research directions. 
Although we have taken reports of food stamp participation as accurate 
in this chapter, previous work has established that food stamp receipt 
is underreported in surveys (Bollinger and David 1997, 2001, 2005; 
Marquis and Moore 1990). This underreporting can have consequenc-
es for the understanding of the relationship between food stamps and 
various outcomes of interest (Gundersen and Kreider 2008). Moreover, 
even though income in the PSID is among the best measured in social 
surveys, there is some evidence of income misreporting, and if this is 
correlated with food stamp participation then our results may be biased. 
Future research should explore the dual roles of income and food stamp 
misreporting on both the determinants of participation and other cor-
related outcomes. Finally, we have not explored the possible role of 
risk aversion with respect to the food stamp participation decision. In 
the 1996 wave of the PSID several questions were asked regarding risk 
aversion, and these variables could potentially be utilized to better un-
derstand how food stamp recipients respond to income volatility. These 
and related issues portend a vibrant research agenda on food assistance 
for many years to come.
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Table 7.6  The Effect of Age and Income Volatility on Food Stamp Participation:  Hausman-Taylor without Birth 








Age between 31 and 40 −0.03 −0.07 −0.03 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 −0.03 −0.11 −0.08 −0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 0.00 −0.07 −0.07 0.00 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 0.01 −0.08 −0.15 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Income volatility 0.26 0.08 −0.03 −0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.02 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.05 0.40 0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility −0.22 0.11 0.05 0.02 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01)
Homeowner −0.03 −0.04 −0.07 −0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
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Married −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
High school graduate 0.01 −0.28 0.13 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
White −0.17 −0.17 −0.16 −0.21
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Family size 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 
in the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
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Age between 31 and 40 −0.02 −0.04 0.00 −0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 −0.02 −0.07 −0.01 −0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Age greater than 60 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.02 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.03 
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.05 0.47 0.01 0.02 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility −0.22 0.21 0.04 0.03 
(0.06) (0.13) (0.03) (0.01)
Homeowner −0.03 −0.03 −0.06 −0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Married −0.02 −0.02 0.00 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
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Family size 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 in 
the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Age between 31 and 40 −0.03 −0.07 −0.03 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 −0.04 −0.12 −0.09 −0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 −0.02 −0.08 −0.08 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age greater than 60 −0.02 −0.08 −0.17 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Income volatility 0.00 0.33 −0.01 0.00 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.09 0.30 0.20 0.01 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.09 0.44 −0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility −0.03 −0.18 −0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Homeowner −0.03 −0.03 −0.08 −0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
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Married −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
High school graduate −0.14 −0.33 0.05 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
White −0.14 −0.18 −0.15 −0.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Family size 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 
in the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Age between 31 and 40 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age between 41 and 50 (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05)
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Age between 51 and 60 0.01 (0.02) 0.06 0.01 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Age greater than 60 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 0.02 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
Income volatility (0.02) 0.31 0.00 0.00 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00)
Age between 31 and 40 × income volatility 0.09 0.30 0.19 0.01 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.12) (0.00)
Age between 41 and 50 × income volatility 0.10 0.44 (0.00) 0.00 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.00)
Age between 51 and 60 × income volatility 0.15 0.17 0.01 (0.00)
(0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.00)
Age greater than 60 × income volatility (0.00) (0.19) (0.02) (0.01)
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00)
Homeowner (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
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Married (0.02) (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Family size 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 72,150 person-years in the full sample, 17,463 in the low education sample, 11,535 
in the income-eligible sample, and 30,305 in the ever income-eligible sample. Each model controls for a vector of year dummies. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1980–2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Notes
This chapter comes from a paper originally prepared for presentation at the Nation-
al Poverty Center/Economic Research Service conference on “Income Volatility and 
Implications for Food Assistance Research II.” The authors thank conference partici-
pants—in particular, Dean Jolliffe and Jeff Smith—and participants in a seminar held at 
Iowa State University’s Department of Economics for excellent comments. The authors 
also thank Brandie Ward for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein 
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the views of of ERS, NPC, 
or any other sponsoring agency.
 1. Income is the sum of labor earnings plus income from rent, interest, and divi-
dends. Transfers include social insurance (Social Security, SSI, Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children [AFDC], and veterans’ benefi ts) and private transfers 
(child support, alimony, and gifts from relatives).
 2. Net income is calculated by subtracting a standard deduction from a household’s 
gross income. In addition to this standard deduction, households with labor earn-
ings deduct 20 percent of those earnings from their gross income. Deductions are 
also taken for child care and care for disabled dependents, medical expenses, and 
excessive shelter expenses. 
 3. Examples of such costs include travel time to a food stamp offi ce and time spent 
in the offi ce, the burden of transporting children to the offi ce or paying for child 
care services, and the direct costs of paying for transportation.
 4. Another approach is to not purge income of these life-cycle age effects. To test the 
robustness of our results, we also considered this alternative approach. While the 
coeffi cients on our income volatility measures and their interactions with age did 
change under this alternative approach, the combined effects were very similar to 
the combined effects in the preferred model. Results are available from the authors 
upon request.
 5. For example, Hausman and Taylor (1981) assume that age in an earnings regression 
is not correlated with the latent heterogeneity but that education is correlated. 
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